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ABSTRACT
Since the pro-market reforms were launched, the Indian economy has grown from 4.7% in the 1990 to
9% in 2011 before slowing down dramatically to nearly half of that rate in recent years. From launching
of reforms until 2011, it did manifest some vivid and impressive signs of India moving towards high
growth and increase in living conditions of its population. The purpose of this article is to access the
likely effects of reform measures on the society, because the mainstream approach suggests that the
reforms can be expected to increase economic growth and incomes. However, this study finds that the
mainstream economists ignore the role of domestic aggregate demand and inequality. India’s growth
was led by the services sector, which included real estates, IT, telecommunications and banking, and
contributed nearly 50% to the GDP in 2012. Manufacturing, which experienced remarkable growth
and transformation in the East Asian economies, had rather grown much slower. The agriculture
sector, which still employs nearly two-third of India’s workforce, remains stagnant. The study suggests
that education and health have been neglected in India and this will compromise productivity and
growth.
Keywords: Indian economy, Neoliberal economic reforms, Growth, Poverty and inequality
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this study is to analyse the economic
performance of the Indian economy and assess
whether the scepticism of the neoliberal reforms is
well founded in the face of experiences and
economic logic.
Since early 1980s, India has been implementing
economic reforms to liberalise the economy by
reducing state ownership and by greater reliance
on trade, foreign capital flows and technology
imports. It was suggested that these reforms would
free the economy from government control and
would move away from its earlier sluggish ‘Hindu
rate of growth’ (Bhagwati, 2013). Those in favour
of the neoliberal reforms India initiated in early
1980s argue that largely due to such policies India
witnessed unprecedented growth rates for the last
three decades. Growth was accompanied by
improvements in living conditions and the proportion
of people whose incomes are below the official
poverty line declined from 45% in 1982 to 28% in
2005 (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 2013).
The neo-liberal economic reforms aimed to promote
business-friendliness and to achieve higher growth
rates, and new hopes were raised that India’s
poverty could be alleviated (World Bank, 1996). It
is true that the economy has grown from 5% per
annum in the 1980s to around 10% per annum in
2011. India has emerged successful in the export
of services, which were US$ 76.2 billion in 2007
and went up to US$ 86 billion in 2011. Export of
services included software, business services,
financial services and communication. However, a
part of those profits were used as overseas
investment to acquire foreign businesses. For
instance, the acquisition of Jaguar and Land Rover
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in UK by Tata Motors, rather than investing
domestically and to create jobs in an economy
starved of investment. India’s capitalists choose to
invest globally where profits may not be higher but
are strategically important.
India’s growth began increasing at higher rates in
the early 1980s and continued until 2011, which led
optimists to speculate that it can emulate China’s
rapid growth performance and can even outshine
China (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2004). However,
in recent years concerns arose once it was obvious
that growth rates could not be sustained: “Why is
the world’s largest democracy apparently doing
worse than the world’s largest dictatorship?.., since
there is precious little comfort in all the comparative
indicators on the current performance of India and
China…On growth, inflation, output per capita,
unemployment, budget deficit, corruption – India is
doing worse than China. The great catch-up
predicted a few years ago has just not happened.
On per capita GDP, for instance, India limps along
US$ 3,851 against China’s US$ 9.146. According
to official figures for 2011, India’s unemployment
was more than double that of China” (Ash, 2013).
The World Bank notes that 45% of India’s children
under five are underweight and 25% of women
remain illiterate (World Bank, 2006).
However, growth has slowed down in recent years
and earlier optimism of taking over China and US
seems to have disappeared. India’s growth rate has
now sunk from nearly 10% per annum in 2010 to
5% per annum in 2012, slipping from the world’s
second-fastest-growing economy to tenth place.
Other economic indicators are equally alarming:
public borrowing has quadrupled in the past five
years, the national deficit is growing, and inflation
is high. The Economic Survey of 2013 presents a
dismal picture of the economic performance
particularly declining growth rates in agriculture and
manufacturing sectors, along with higher inflation
and widening current account deficit. The question
arises what went wrong?
Since 2011 growth is slowing down dramatically to
less than half that rate of previous years. From the
launching of reforms until 2011, they did manifest
some vivid and impressive signs of India moving
towards greater consumer capitalism. Consumer
demand was boosted by the availability of cheap
credits and imported brand goods finally became
accessible to the rich who were long starved of
them by an inward looking economic regime that
substituted Indian products for imports (Siddiqui,
2010; Kohli, 2012).
At present the Indian economy shows more serious
obstacles to sustainable growth than any of the
other emerging economies. It appears that the
decline in growth rates is not mainly due to the
global recession and also not due to “inadequacy”
of economic reforms. India’s growth has been led
by the services sector, which includes real estates,
IT, telecommunications, and banking and contributes
nearly 50% to the GDP in 2013. Manufacturing,
which experienced a remarkable growth and
transformation of the East Asian economies, had
rather grown much slower in India (Siddiqui, 2011).
The agriculture sector, which still employs nearly
two-third of India’s workforce, remains stagnant.
We find a small percentage of well-educated
workforce that enjoys rising wages, while there has
been hardly any noticeable improvements in real
wages and productivity for people trapped in the
bottom half of the dual economy: agriculture and
the so-called informal sector, which provides
livelihoods for two-third of India’s workforce
(Byres, 1994).
Recently India witnessed a ballooning of current
account deficits. India’s current account deficit
raised from US$ 2.5 billion (0.4% of the GDP) in
2004-2005 to a very high figure US$ 87.8 billion
(4.8% of GDP) in 2012-2013. This increase was
due to the rapid increase of the deficit of
merchandise trade, which grew from US$ 33.7
billion in 2004-2005 to US$ 191.7 billion in 2012–
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2013. This dramatic growth of imports was partly
due to gold and petroleum products. Government
policy responses consist of measures to attract
foreign capital to finance growing current account
deficit (Siddiqui, 2014). It is also said that the
government cannot do much to bring down the
deficit in merchandise trade. It is claimed that the
growth of current account deficit is due to the on-
going global economic crisis, which led to the
decline in exports. Others argue that the reversal
of capital flows due to a tightening of monetary
policy in US might be discontinued. It led to the
decline of inflow in foreign capital, while at the same
time capital outflow increased (Ghose, 2013;
Binswanger-Mkhize, 2013).
The mainstream economists argue that slow growth
rates between 1950 and 1980, could be too small
to provide much help to the poor via redistribution.
Therefore, according to them, every step must be
taken to assist and achieve higher growth rates.
They believe that GDP growth is sufficient to
remove poverty (Ahluwalia, 2002). This proposition
seems very logical. However, if we suppose this is
true then in India why last three decades of higher
growth has accompanied with worsening income
distribution and persistence of high poverty.
Between 2004–2005 and 2009–2010, the National
Sample Survey (NSS) organisation carried out large
surveys on employment of the period when GDP
grew at 8.7% per annum, which was quite
remarkable. However, employment creation was
abysmal, which was less than 1% per annum.
Despite three decades of rapid growth, chronic
malnutrition is widespread among India’s
population. Though there is a reduction in the
number of people living below poverty lines (as
officially defined). The Tendulkar Committee has
changed the official definition of poverty and moved
away to defining official poverty line in calorie
terms, as in the past the estimation was based on
per capita consumer expenditures. However, it has
still not reduced nutritional deficiency
proportionately and still malnutrition persists,
especially among children and females. As Deaton
and Dreze note, “overall levels of child under-
nutrition in India (including not only severe but also
“moderate” undernourishment are still very high
both in absolute terms as well as relative to other
countries. Even today close to half of all Indian
children are underweight and about half suffer from
anaemia. These are appalling figures, which places
India among the most “undernourished” countries
in the world…In particular, child undernourishment
is much higher in south Asia (48.5% underweight
in 1991) than in sub-Saharan Africa (29.6%
underweight in 2005)” (Deaton and Dreze,
2009:50).
The neglect of the social sector is very visible both
in pre and post reform periods and here the market
failed to resolve this problem and long-term
investments in education and public health were
needed. However, in these primary tasks, the
government failed miserably. As Dreze and Sen
has called, “the elitist character of Indian society
and politics”. Every year, more children die in India
than anywhere else in the world: 1.7 million children
under the age of five die largely from easily
preventable illnesses such as diarrhoea. Of those
who do survive until the age of five, 48% are stunted
as a result of a lack of nutrients: child malnutrition
in India is higher than in Eritrea. Similarly, the most
basic health measure that any government can
provide for its people is to immunise very young
children but, in India, only 43.5% of children are
completely immunised, compared to 73.1% in
Bangladesh (Dreze and Sen, 2013).
Other emerging economies, such as the Chinese
government spends 2.7% of its GDP on health care,
while India allocates only 1.2%. Dreze and Sen
(2013) argue that if India fails to improve in social
sectors this would depress living standards and will
drag on long-term growth. In addition, wages in
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the manufacturing sector in China have grown by
12% since 2000, compared with 2.5% in India, and
moreover, 90% of Indians still work in what is
referred to as “the informal sector”. It seems that
India has failed to learn from the examples of East
Asian countries, where the rapid expansion of
human capability was considered an important goal
in achieving rapid economic development. Japan
pioneered that approach, starting after the Meiji
restoration in 1868, when the country’s political will
was backed by increased government spending to
achieve a fully literate population within a few
decades.
However, compared to the pre-independence
period, the economy has taken some major strides.
For instance, in the period from 1901 to 1947, India’s
GDP grew at 0.9% per annum and per capita GDP
by only 0.1% (Siddiqui, 2009). During the colonial
rule (1757–1947) life expectancy in India was only
39 years in 1946 as against 66 in 2012. Similarly,
infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) came
down from 180 to 44 (Dreze and Sen, 2013). In
short, the economic growth rate of the Indian
economy was dismal and its economy was
insignificant in the world both in terms of global
GDP and in the production of industrial goods. GDP
growth rates then were an average 0.9% and per
capita income grew only at 0.1% per annum.
Globally India was regarded as a marginal country
with the occurrence of famine and existence of
mass poverty and illiteracy (Dreze and Sen, 2013).
POLICY INITIATIVE
Prior to our discussion of India’s post-independence
development strategy, it will be useful to briefly
examine the pre-independence economic structure.
Karl Marx’s observation regarding the British
colonial penetration with respect to India concluded
in his letter to Vera Zasulich in 1881 as follows:
“What the English take from them annually in the
form of rent, dividends for railway was useless to
the Hindoos [Hindus], pensions for military and civil
servicemen, for Afghanistan and other wars etc.
etc.–what they take from them without any
equivalent and quite apart from what they
appropriate to themselves annually within India,
speaking only of the value of the commodities that
Indians have gratuitously and annually sent over to
England, it amounts to more than the total sum of
income of the 60 millions of agricultural and
industrial labourers of India. This is a bleeding
process, with a vengeance” (cited in Mohri, 1979).
India has made more remarkable economic
progress than it did in the past two hundred years
in the matter of economic growth. In the period of
1901–1947, India’s GDP grew at 0.9% per annum
and per capita GDP by only 0.1% (Siddiqui, 2009).
During colonial rule (1757–1947), the Indian
economy was marginalised and transformed into a
source of raw materials, agricultural commodities
and minerals for the burgeoning factories in
England, and a market for British finished products.
This was specially witnessed in the textile sector,
as India was transformed into the exporter of raw
materials and importer of finished products. Colonial
rule had damaged the Indian economy, with an
underproductive agriculture, a weak industrial base,
and extremely low levels of literacy (27% for men,
9% for women) in 1947 (Bagchi, 2000).
Large tracts of land were converted into production
of cash crops such as tea, indigo, coffee, and poppy
to produce opium (Siddiqui, 1990). As a result, India
did emerge in the first half of the 20th century with
one of the lowest per capita incomes, highest rates
of poverty and malnutrition in the world. As Brown
describes, “Britain’s Indian empire, where cotton
and jute, coir and timber, tea and tropical fruits were
grown for export, often at the expense of food crops
for the people. India became the jewel in the
imperial diamond, offered the largest market for
Britain’s manufactures and largest source of raw
materials, but also a steady supply of tribute in gold
and silver and of soldiers for the imperial army”
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(Brown, 1993:17). Furthermore he adds, “Until then
[18th century] India had supplied Europe with its
calicos and muslins, as China had supplied the silks
and satins.... Bengal exported millions of pounds
worth of cotton goods each year. Yet within 60 years
their export had ceased and India was importing
cloth from British factories... on Indians (people)
the effect of the destruction of native industries
was worse even than the flow of tribute. The first
famines were reported in 1770” (Brown, 1993:18).
Moreover, during the 19th century, Britain imposed
free trade on its colonies including India, the very
same policies that had led a revolt in British North
America and finally secession in 1783. As a
consequence of free trade policies, India could not
protect its domestic industries (Siddiqui, 1996),
Japan in the 19th century successfully resisted
colonialism and protected its infant industries and
imported new technologies instead of new products
as India was forced to do. The broader impact for
India was that urban centres became depopulated
due to the closure of industries; rural population
and poverty increased and the occurrence of
famines became more frequent. While at the same
time, in Britain the rural population declined, with
the expansion of manufacturing sector the urban
population increased (Girdner and Siddiqui, 2008).
The British military adventure across Asia and
Africa also put an increasing burden on Indian
peasants as colonial India was forced to contribute
both financially and to supply soldiers for British
wars in Afghanistan, Burma, China, Hong Kong,
Singapore, Persia, Egypt, and Ethiopia and Sudan
(Bagchi, 2000).
However, after independence in 1947, India
launched a very ambitious development strategy
based on import-substitution industrialisation. Prime
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru adopted economic
policies, which were said to be influenced by the
ideas of Raul Prebisch, Ragnar Nurske, and Michael
Kalecki (Prebisch, 1950; Das, 2011). The
government took various measures to boost the
growth and as a result, between 1950 and 1980 the
GDP growth rate rose to 3.5% per annum and per
capita GDP growth was 1.2% for the same period.
From an extremely low level, the Indian economy
has experienced a modest improvement in living
conditions such as eliminating famines, achieving
self–sufficiency in food production and some
improvement in social development.
The industrial growth picked up in 1950s due to
import-substitution industrialisation, but in the late
1960s this sector experienced slow growth and
stagnation. Some critiques argue that the stagnation
in industrial sector was due to slow growth in the
agricultural sector, while others blame the unequal
income distribution and cuts in government spending
(Dutt and Mohan, 1996).
During the period 1950–1980, economic growth in
India was slow, but no worse than the performance
of most of the other developing countries. Prior to
1980s the Indian economy was characterised by
slow growth, accompanied by high rate of
population growth, which implied a very small rate
of growth of per capita GDP. India’s growth
performance was much less satisfactory compared
to the East Asian economies during the same
period. Some argued that this was because of slow
growth of domestic markets which was largely due
to slow growth in real wages and slow growth in
agricultural productivity (Dutt and Mohan, 1996).
Therefore, agriculture development depending on
public investment came to a dead end, along with
the deepening crisis and an increased offensive by
the international financial institutions. An analysis
of India’s growth divides into two periods namely,
1947 to the 1980 and 1980s to the present. Prior to
1980, India’s development was driven by an ‘import
substitution’ strategy. It aimed to promote domestic
heavy industries led by the public sector, but private
sector’s contribution was also seen as an important
part of these policies (Das, 2011).
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The growth rate has picked up in 1980s and it was
average 5.2% from 1981 to 1991 per annum, 5.9%
from 1991 to 2001 and 7.6% from 2001 to 2011.
The GDP per capita grew at 3%, 4%, and 6%,
respectively, for the corresponding years. The rate
of growth of per capita GDP from 2001 to 2011
was 60 times the rate under colonial rule.
Agriculture witnessed an increase in growth during
the 1980s, that is, 3.4%, labour productivity at 2.3%
and total factor productivity (TFP) at 2% per
annum. Key economic indicators between 2006–
2007 and 2011–2012 are shown in Table 1. It is far
better than the last two decades (Economic Survey
2012). The higher growth rates in agriculture in
the 1970s and 80s is said to be due to the spread of
‘green revolution’ across the regions of India and
also due to the increase in government spending in
the agricultural sector. China’s agriculture growth
rate was more than 3% for the last three decades,
which is much higher than India. At the same time
China’s population growth rate has remained to
almost zero, while India has witnessed higher
growth rate of population of 1.9% annually over
the past decade (Siddiqui, 2009). The GDP grew
at a moderate pace from 1950 to 1980, but rose at
higher rates after 1982. The population grew at
2.2% annually and between 1950 and 1980 average
GDP per capita grew at 1.5% annually, which rose
sharply at the average rate of 3.4% in the 1980s.
The growth rates in pre-reform period were lower
than East Asian economies (Girdner and Siddiqui,
2008; World Bank, 2008).
As Figure 1 indicates, agriculture growth rates have
been much lower than the non-agriculture sector.
In fact the difference has been greater, that is, 9%
points in GDP growth in 2002. Moreover, within
the non-agriculture sector, the growth rates in
services have outpaced that of manufacturing. Here
also we find that the difference was larger in 2011,
that is, the services grew at 9%, while
manufacturing rose only at 4% (Economic Survey,
2013; Mishra, 2013).
The Indian economy has two distinct sectors: one
uses modern technology, a high ratio of capital to
labour, that is, high wages and productivity, while
the other a low ratio of capital to labour, and has
lower productivity and wages. High and imbalanced
sectoral and regional growth deepens the existing
problems. Several Latin American countries that
tried to develop without involving large parts of the
rural population into the modern sectors of the
economy were prone to widening inequality and
social tensions (Siddiqui, 2010). India has not
experienced a similar breakthrough to those shown
by East Asian countries during their phase of
Table 1: India’s Main Economic Indicators: 2006–2012
2006–07 2007–08 2008–09 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12
GDP (at constant prices of 2004) 9.6 9.3 6.7 8.9 8.6 5.9
Gross fixed capital formation 13.8 16.2 3.5 6.8 7.5 5.4
Inflation 6.7 6.2 9.1 12.4 10.4 8.4
Current account balance (CAB/GDP) -1.0 -1.3 2.3 -2.8 -2.7 -3.6
Gross fiscal deficit (% of GDP) 3.3 2.5 6.0 6.5 4.8 4.6
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 4.2 5.8 0.1 1.0 7.0 2.5
Manufacturing 14.3 10.3 4.3 9.7 7.6 3.9
Construction 10.3 10.8 5.3 7.0 8.0 4.8
Trade, transport & communication 11.7 10.7 7.6 10.3 11.1 11.2
Finance, real estate and business services 14.0 12.0 12.0 9.4 10.4 9.1
Source: Economic Survey (2012) Government of India, New Delhi: Ministry of Finance
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industrialisation. For instance, Japan, South Korea
and Taiwan committed huge increase in government
spending on their agriculture and education in the
early phase of industrialisation. The East Asian
countries launched a “dual strategy” to achieve
higher growth along with an increase in productivity
in both agriculture and industrial sectors (Stiglitz,
1996).
As manufacturing growth and productivity
increased, the inter-sectoral differences in growth
widened. In India, the share of manufacturing is
low, which stagnated around 16% of the GDP since
mid-1980s, while China’s share of manufacturing
is more than 28% in 2012, from 46% in 1995.
Moreover, the recent boom is led by service sectors
such as real estate, insurance, finance, and IT-
related services. It currently accounts for 20% of
India’s GDP, while they provide only 2% of the
total employment. The employees in these sectors
also receive higher earnings compared to the rest
of the economy; such growth clearly widened
further income inequality (Mishra, 2013).
Since the neoliberal economic reform was launched,
the Indian economy has witnessed sharp growth,
especially in services and some modest growth in
the manufacturing sector too. For instance, India’s
IT sector alone earned US$ 86 billion in 2011,
mostly in export revenues. However, part of those
profits is used as overseas investment to acquire
foreign businesses rather than investing
domestically. Since 2011 the growth is slowing down
dramatically to less than half that rate of previous
years. From the launching of neoliberal reforms
until 2011, India does manifest some vivid and
impressive signs of India moving towards ‘crony
capitalism’.
The agriculture sector is quite important for the
Indian economy and currently contributes 30% of
the GDP and provides employment to more than
60% of the labour force. Soon after independence,
growth in the agriculture sector picked up because
the area under cultivation expanded. However, in
the late 1960s and 1970s agricultural growth rose
due to higher public spending in new inputs such as
new seeds, electricity, fertilizers, and water, known
as the green revolution (Storm, 2001).
India’s green revolution started in Punjab and
western UP in mid-1960s and later on spread to
Figure 1: Growth Rates: Agriculture vs Non-Agriculture
Source: Economic Survey, 2013: Mishra, 2013: 55
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other parts of the country where the availability of
ground water and access to credit and subsidised
fertilizer, electricity and diesel encouraged certain
sections of farmers to invest in agriculture. In the
mid-1960s with the adoption of ‘Green Revolution’,
overall agricultural output was increased, which
made India self-sufficient in food grains, but this
strategy relied mainly on rich and large farmers to
produce more, bypassing the small and agricultural
labourers (Byres 1994; Siddiqui, 1999a). However,
by the mid-1980s, this technology largely ran out
of steam. To sustain growth government
expenditure on inputs and support prices of grains
were increased (Siddiqui, 1999b). The government
food subsidies to purchase grain at above market
prices from the farmers was less than 0.2% of the
GDP in the 1980s, but it has multiplied several times
over the last three decades.
During the pre-reform period agriculture was
protected by the offer of cheap credits, subsidised
inputs such as diesel, electricity, fertilizers etc. In
addition, farmers were assured higher
remunerative prices. However, with the launching
of neoliberal policies, the role of government has
been changed and market forces have been
assigned a central role.
The agriculture sector did not experience any rapid
growth in the post-reform period, which could have
meant a boost in job opportunities in the rural areas.
Figure 2: Share of agriculture labour force and non-agricultural output per worker
Source: Economic Survey (2012) Government of India, New Delhi: Ministry of Finance; Binswanger-Mkhize, Hans P. 2013
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On an average, China has achieved more than 3%
per annum agriculture growth for the last three
decades in a row, an unprecedented performance
in the world. The manufacturing sector as well
displayed some growth, but did not lead to job
creation or a boost in exports. Contrary to India, in
China foreign capital was invested in the
manufacturing sector, which resulted in the rapid
expansion of export sector and employment
opportunities. China also devalued the exchange
rate of Yuan in mid 1990s by 40% and kept it fixed
to improve its export products. While India
emphasised short-term borrowing to stimulate the
economy and has to revalue Rupee and flexible
exchange rate to attract short term flows of capital,
such policies has made India’s export prices less
competitive in foreign markets. China does not
allow foreign institutional investors in Chinese share
market or real estate sectors, while India does.
Recently the degree of openness of Indian
agriculture is intensely discussed. This issue has
been discussed in the context of the global
liberalisation of agriculture trade under the World
Trade Organisation (WTO). There is no urgent
demand for immediate and complete free trade in
agriculture but the WTO would like to see the
opening up of Indian markets in a phased manner
and the removal of input subsidies. The debate is
about the question of whether a ‘closer’ integration
of Indian agriculture with the world economy would
result in higher agricultural output growth and as a
consequence rural equity and prosperity of its
inhabitants (Krueger, 1992). It is further argued that
closer integration would also mean higher growth
in productivity and exports and also better terms of
trade achieved for Indian farmers by means of
‘getting price right’ (Storm, 2001; Krueger, 1992;
Ocampo, and Taylor, 1998; World Bank, 2006).
Historical factors for specific countries such as
India and its levels of development in agriculture
sector demands according to critics’, a slow degree
of openness to the international markets. Despite
the dismantling of quantitative restrictions of minor
commodities and fully liberalised rice exports,
agriculture performance has not been satisfactory,
especially the growth rates in food grains in the
post-reform period. During the period of 1991–2005
the average annual food grain growth rate was at
1.7%, which was lower than the population growth
of 1.9%, while supporters would like to see further
liberalisation in agriculture (World Bank, 2000). The
World Bank (2000) argues that such steps would
invite more investment in the agriculture sector. The
critics favour ‘strategic’ rather than ‘close’
integration because of specific nature of Indian
agriculture and rural society and equity. Due to the
existence of a large informal sector and
unorganised labour force, any sudden increase in
food prices or large fluctuations due to world’s
prices will have adverse impact on food grain
demand and food consumptions of the poor people
(Storm, 2001).
In the post-reform period, the removal of controls
from investment resulted in the attraction of
investment by regions having a better infrastructure.
This resulted in greater regional inequalities than in
the recent past as backward regions that used to
receive resources from the central government
through grants are largely denied on the name of
austerity and a balance budget. As a result states
like Assam, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan,
Jharkhand, and UP have failed to expand industries.
However, it seems that India is unable to recognise
that increased flows of hot money cannot provide
long-term solutions.
India’s growth has slowed down since 2011 and
domestic investment has been insufficient as well.
India’s external debts went up to US$ 327 billion in
2012. In 2007 the stock market and real estate
sector was opened for foreign investors, which led
to sharp increase in these sectors and India also
witnessed a massive inflow of short-term capital
investment in these sectors.
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Some argue that reforms have been inadequate,
which is hardly convincing. It is more than two
decades now since neoliberal reforms were
launched (Ahluwalia, 2011). It has been said that
global recession adversely affected growth as well.
However, compared to East Asian countries, India
is less integrated with developed countries though,
as a result should be less affected. The sustainability
of India’s economic growth is based primarily on
exploitation of natural resources, cheap labour and
foreign capital inflows, and not on high productivity
and innovation and therefore, cannot be sustained
(Dutt and Rao, 1996). Portfolio investment rose
from US$ 9.3 billion in 2002 to US$ 12.2 billion in
2006. Investment by foreign institutional investors
in India increased from US$ 377 million in 2002 to
US$ 9.9 billion in 2006. However, during the same
period foreign direct investment of long-term nature
rose at much slower rate from US$ 3.7 billion in
2002 to US$ 4.7 billion in 2006 (Economic Survey,
2008). Meanwhile the trade deficit rose from US$
33.7 billion in 2002 to US$ 51.84 billion in 2006.
Total borrowing rose to finance the deficit by 3.4
times during the same period. Relying on foreign
investors and international finance for a long-term
growth strategy itself is questionable, because
foreign investors keep shifting factories to low-
wage countries because of the mobility of capital.
Those who are against state-led development argue
that from early 1950s to 1990 this restricted the
growth of Indian economy (Ahluwalia, 2002, World
Bank, 2000). They argue that neoliberal reforms
would unleash rapid growth rates, which will
ultimately solve the problems of unemployment and
poverty. It was said that the previous regime of
government led development has resulted in slower
growth rates, which is also known as ‘Hindu rate
of growth’. The neoliberal reform was supposed
to bring rapid development by removing the
distortions caused by restrictive government policies
under import-substitution development of 1951–
1990. When we compare the pre and post reform
periods performance, only the service sector
performed better, but agriculture and manufacturing
did not perform well as expected in the post-reform
period.
There seems to be mainly two major factors
responsible for the slow growth rates in the
agriculture sector. First the government spending
in agriculture was reduced in order to reduce fiscal
deficits. Second, import liberalisation has adversely
affected remunerative prices for agriculture
products, which led the farmers to curtail their farm
operations. As a result, rural unemployment and
farmers debt has increased sharply and according
to official figures, since early 1990s the suicide rate
among the farmers has increased sharply. Vasavi
(2012) on the issue of farmers suicide provides us
an important study to support her point that
increased risks affects the livelihoods of the
agriculturists due to government’s neoliberal policies
and the impact of commercialised agriculture.
According to her the risks, “imprint agriculturists
in multiple ways: an ecological risk deletes local
resources and defies ecological specificity;
economic risks that encapsulate and enmesh
agriculturists into external circuits and demands of
capital and credits; and as personal risks, that
become loaded as social psychological burdens, and
which constitute and entail the marginal
agriculturists the defining terms in which they must
conduct agriculture and also their lives” (Vasavi,
2012: 1997–1998). Production of overall food grains
has declined such as for wheat, rice, pulses etc.
As a result the net availability of pulses per capita,
for example, declined from 41.6 grams in 1991 to
35.8 grams in 2005. Availability of cereals per
person declined from 468.5 grams in 1991 to 358
grams in 2006 (Economic Survey, 2009).
Increase in employment in public sector was much
higher during the pre-reform period than during the
post-reform period. This was observed for the
manufacturing and the construction sectors.
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Although in the private sector, employment
generation was higher in the later period, but such
was not the case in the construction sector. The
employment in manufacturing sector declined from
68.5 million in 1998 to 66.2 million in 2000. In the
agriculture sector employment declined from 1.49
million in 1992 to 1.42 million in 2000; mining
decreased from 1.12 million in 1994 to 1.01 million
in 2000. However, the service sector witnessed an
increase in employment opportunities especially in
the finance and real estate sectors. For example,
in finance and insurance employment was 0.25
million, which rose to 1.09 million in 2008 and further
rose to 1.55 in 2011 (Economic Survey, 2012).
GROWTH, POVERTY AND INEQUALITY
The Indian economy has grown four and half times
since 1980 to a value of US$ 1.8 trillion (Economic
Survey, 2013). However, still it remains a poor
country where a large part of the population lacks
basic sanitation. Yet it is undeniable that economic
expansion has transformed cities like Bangalore,
Chennai, Delhi, Hyderabad and Mumbai, benefitting
the rich and upper middle class in particular. There
remain different views about how widely this
growth has been shared. The supporters of the neo-
liberal reforms hold that India’s reforms have
benefitted the economy as it has raised the
competitiveness in the domestic economy as a
result not only high tech sectors such as IT and
services witnessed rapid growth and managed to
build confidence in the overall economy. Jagdish
Bhagwati, 2013, Ahluwalia, 2011 and World Bank,
2006 are perhaps the most prominent proponents
of such a view.
While the critics argue that nearly three decades
of higher growth has largely benefitted the privileged
and hardly made any differences to the life of less
well off. Such views are put forward by Dreze
and Sen. They argue that despite experiencing rapid
growth India has not witnessed any improvement
in living conditions of majority of the people. In fact,
on measures of human development, India has
moved down and inequality has risen sharply. World
Bank data indicates that India’s Gini Coefficient, a
measure of inequality, has increased from 31 in
1994 to 33 in 2005 (World Bank, 2008).
Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen (2013) emphasise
that aggregate economic growth is important for
generating public revenue, which can be used to
reduce poverty. However, “it is only one of many
different concerns that need attention.” The lesser
optimist, Sen and Dreze, argue that reforms that
boost growth, though important, were not enough
to improve the living conditions of the poorest, let
alone dismantle caste and gender hierarchies and
generate employment. They “have to be
supplemented,” they argued, “by a radical shift in
public policy in education and health.” Brazil, for
instance, grew only 1% compared to India’s 5%
from 1993 to 2005 but reduced poverty much
faster. Bangladesh has only half of the India’ per
capita income, but the economy has performed
better in social indicators such as child mortality,
immunisation, literacy, crime against women and
even life expectancy (Dreze and Sen, 2013).
India’s economy is slowing and economic growth
reached nearly 10% per annum, which is now less
than 5%. Prices are up, investment and industrial
production are down and wages are static.
Moreover, to a large extent this rapid growth did
not create jobs, which is called as jobless growth.
The fact is that the majority of 12 million youth
added to the workforce each year and the present
economic pattern of development compels them to
move to big cities from a crisis-ridden agricultural
sector where 270, 000 of farmers have committed
suicide since 1991. In 2011 alone, according to the
official figures, 14,000 farmers took their own lives
(Mohanty, 2013; Vasavi, 2012).
In the post reform period, on the other hand, the
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wealth assets of few rich have seen a tremendous
increase. For example, there were just 2 billionaires
in India in 1995, with their combined total net worth
of US$ 3.2 billion, while their number rose to 46
with a total net worth of US$ 176.3 billion in 2012.
Forbes (2012) data indicates that by 2010 India’s
100 wealthiest people had increased their combined
worth to US$300 billion, a quarter of the country’s
GDP. Out of India’s 46 billionaires, nearly half of
this number have drawn their primary source of
wealth, which is called “rent-thick”, from sectors
such as mining, real estates, construction, energy,
infrastructure etc. All these sectors are also known
for close nexus between them and the government.
The remaining billionaires have drawn their wealth
from other sectors such as software, automotive,
biotech, pharmaceuticals, telecom etc. The most
striking features of the Indian growth are that since
the reform of 1991 their wealth has grown
dramatically (Forbes, 2012). It could be called
economic rent, primarily received from monopolistic
economic power or needed licenses from
government, in highly government controlled areas.
Recent corruption scandals involving privatisation
and the sale of billions of dollars’ worth of national
resources such as telecommunications, mines,
forests, land and water reveal that crony capitalism
and rent-seeking, rather than entrepreneurial
dynamism and innovation in a free market, are the
real engines of India’s economic growth (The
Economist, 2014; Kohli, 2012).
The inequality issue is important because it
determines what the share of the poor in growth
process will be. In countries with higher initial
inequality, the poor tend to have a lower share of
the gains from growth. Recently published NSS
report data tells us the rising trends in inequality in
India shown in Table 2. The Gini Coefficient for
rural India increased from 0.27 to 0.28, with rural
inequality rising in 11 Indian states. However, the
states, which had higher growth rates, performed
poor in poverty reduction. The states with lower
growth rates saw a decline in inequality, such as
Tripura. For example, Bihar state despite
experiencing higher growth rates did not witness
any reduction in rural poverty. The rural Gini
Coefficient increased from 0.19 to 0.22, whereas
Maharashtra, had a comparable growth rate and
reduction in Gini Coefficient and a substantial
poverty reduction. The states where the Gini
Coefficient has increased most are: Andhra
Pradesh, Gujarat, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh
(Economic Survey, 2013).
The real wage rates of workers in organised
manufacturing sector hardly witnessed any rise
between 1992–1993 and 2007–2008. While at the
same time after 1992, the real wages experienced
decline because of a sharp increase in food prices
with the introduction of neoliberal reforms.
Moreover, higher growth failed to increase
employment opportunities due to rise in labour
productivity and with the increasing use of
Table 2: Consumption Inequality in India
1983 1987-88 1993-94 2004-05 2009-10
Gini Coefficient of distribution of consumption
Rural 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.30 0.28
Urban 0.30 0.35 0.34 0.37 0.37
Urban-rural ratio of mean consumption
(constant prices)* 1.54 1.44 1.64 1.72 1.69
*Original shows urban-rural ratio
Source: Ahluwalia, Montek S. 2011, Table 6; Economic Survey, several issues, Government of India, New Delhi
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automisation in the manufacturing sector. The
effect of technological progress at present is far
more labour displacing than it was in the early 20th
century. Between 1988–1989 and 2009–2010, the
average real wage rates of workers in organised
manufacturing sector in India has actually declined
even as labour productivity has risen (Mishra,
2013).
The rural poor are hardly better off than three
decades ago. About 44% children under five are
malnourished, worse than sub-Saharan Africa and
25% women are illiterate. India’s human
development statistics are worse than the
corresponding ones in a number of countries that
are poorer in terms of GDP per head. According
to official figures 17,000 farmers took their own
lives in 2010 alone, when their crop failed (Dreze
and Sen, 2013; Vasavi, 2012).
The critics argue that it is beyond doubts that the
GDP growths for the last three decades have been
impressive, but show hardly any improvement in
areas like health and education. They say that
government neglect in these crucial sectors have
given enormous inequalities in human capabilities
in India. Dreze and Sen (2013) study on India
compare India’s development with other developing
countries. They insist that successful economic
development does not need: Track i and Track ii.
First it is aimed at a rapid increase in growth rates
and later on focus on social and poverty issues,
which is also known as ‘trickle down’ effects. They
insist far better economic policies could have been
employed where GDP growth rates were to an
extent traded off for more improvements in
education and health. They cite the successful
examples of Japan, South Korea, Singapore and
Taiwan. These countries pursued both higher
growth strategies along with continuous
improvement in education and health sectors,
because poor availability of education and health
would adversely affect productivity and so GDP
growth rates. India spends one quarter of what the
Chinese government spends on health care. For
instance, at present India spends only 1.2% of GDP
while China spends about 3% (Dreze and Sen,
2013).
The question arises if growth is only factor that is
crucial for poverty reduction as suggested by
mainstream economists (Bhagwati, 2013), then
India should have witnessed huge poverty
reduction in the last three decades, but it did not
happen. The other crucial point is that states with
highest growth rates should have performed best
in terms of poverty reduction. Planning Commission
(2008) recently has released poverty figures on the
basis of Tendulkar Committee. According to
Planning Commission Report, the poverty head
counts ratio (HCR) declined by 8% in rural and
4.8% in urban areas between 2004–2005 and
2009–2010. The current estimate also includes
government’s expenditure on mid-day meal
scheme, although the poverty numbers have
declined but it is still quite high, that is, 33.8% for
rural and 20.9% for urban areas in 2009–2010
(Binswanger-Mkhize, 2013).
CONCLUSION
To boost growth the government undertook a
number of measures to attract foreign investors.
Restrictions on ‘single brand’ foreign investors, such
as IKEA have been relaxed. Foreign companies
now can own such outlets without the need for
local partners and also foreign companies are no
more required to source from local suppliers. The
government also promised to open new areas for
foreign investors such as power, broadcasting and
aviation. Economic growth, which does not take
account of the social and political changes
accompanying it could be unhealthy, and could
create additional problems.
It seems that despite the higher growth
performance in the post-reform period, it had little
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success in reduction in poverty levels. The study
finds that besides non-performance in employment
and poverty fronts neoliberal reforms did not
improve performance of the social sectors.
Increased public investment in education and health
will have positive impact on the welfare of women
and children. In recent years, despite some modest
improvements in education and health sector, India
is still far behind when compared with other
developing countries. Dreze and Sen (2013)
emphasise that a better pattern of economic
development is one in which GDP growth is to an
extent traded off for more rapid improvements in
living conditions, especially in education and health.
The study suggests that in India education and health
have been neglected and this will compromise
productivity and growth. This is shown by the
comparison with East Asian countries (such as
China, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) who
have invested comparatively heavily in these areas.
During the last decade, it appears that the growth
of the economy is fuelled by increasing flows of
short-term foreign capital both in stock markets and
real estate sectors, which suddenly pushed growth
rates. To protect the economy from speculative
attack, foreign investment should be restricted in
the share markets and real estate businesses. Public
investment in infrastructure and agriculture should
be given priority. The increased investment in such
crucial areas would attract further private investors
and as a result employment opportunities will
expand. The problem seems to be that of neoliberal
economic reforms ignoring key components of long
term growth such as structural problems and income
distribution. The mainstream economists ignore
crucial issues like lack of rural investment, slow
growth in productivity and rural poverty. Earlier
Michael Kalecki (1976) warned that slow growth
in agriculture holds back industrial growth because
of the disproportionalities it creates both in the
supply and demand side of the economy.
The study concludes that since the launching of
neoliberal reforms, the interdependence between
agriculture and industry has not been taken into
account. Higher growth in the agricultural sector
would be able to raise agricultural output and also
farmers’ income, and would enhance domestic
markets. It is important to expand domestic demand
and simply inviting more foreign capital will not lead
to a higher growth trajectory. The aim should be to
make agriculture less vulnerable to weather
conditions. Sustained growth is not difficult to
achieve but it does not have to be based solely on
mercantilists export strategy as the recent examples
in East Asian countries have shown us.
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